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Abstract
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Policy Research Working Paper 5938
 This paper assesses the benefits, risks, and limitations 
of human rights based approaches to development, 
which can be catalogued on the basis of the institutional 
mechanisms they rely on: global compliance based on 
international and regional treaties; the policies and 
programming of donors and executive agencies; rights 
talk; and legal mobilization. The paper briefly reviews 
the politics of the first three kinds of human rights based 
approaches before examining constitutionally based 
legal mobilization for social and economic rights in 
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greater detail. Litigation for social and economic rights 
is increasing in frequency and scope in several countries, 
and exhibits appealing attributes, such as inclusiveness 
and deliberative quality. Still, there are potential problems 
with this form of human rights based mobilization, 
including middle class capture, the potential counter-
majoritarianism of courts, and difficulties in compliance. 
The conclusion summarizes what is known, and what 
remains to be studied, regarding human rights based 
approaches to development.Human Rights Based Approaches to Development: 
Concepts, Evidence, and Policy 
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Human  rights  are  probably  the  dominant  normative  conception  in  the  contemporary 
globalized world. It is common for struggles for national self-determination, the recognition of 
alternative identities, class-based and labor empowerment, gender equality, democratic inclusion, 
property rights  protections,  rectification of state violence, and  consumer goods  to  use  rights 
discourse – in spite of varying political orientations and alliances among the actors involved. 
Development is no exception. Whereas it was understood primarily in the terms of economic 
output  from  about  1950  to  1970,  and  concerned  with  poverty  from  around  1970  to  1990, 
development has in the past two decades increasingly been framed in the language of human 
rights  and  related  concepts,  such  as  fundamental  human  capabilities  and  multi-dimensional 
poverty. The objectives for doing so, on the part of advocates, have been, broadly speaking, to 
characterize the elimination of extreme poverty as a moral imperative, and to underscore that the 
kind  of  political  power  associated  with  the  assertion  of  claims  by  the  poor  themselves  is  a 
prerequisite to the elimination of extreme poverty. The first point is commonly thought of as 
speaking to  the ―intrinsic‖  dimension of human rights,  and the latter  to their ―instrumental‖ 
dimension.  
The intrinsic dimension is instrumentally useful, however, if it mobilizes rich country 
governments and citizens, as well as the privileged citizens of developing countries, to contribute 
more resources to development, and to do so more effectively. So perhaps it is better to say that 
there are aspects of human rights based approaches to development (HRBAs) that target duty-
bearers by raising the moral pressure, and other aspects that target rights-holders by instilling the 
dignity and self-respect necessary for political, social, and legal mobilization; and that both can, 
arguably, reduce poverty and inequality at the global and national levels. In other words, HRBAs 
work both on the supply and demand sides of development.  3 
 
Although HRBAs have been widely discussed and used, definitions vary; and there is 
not, to our knowledge, an authoritative source. For our purposes, we define HRBAs as principles 
that  justify demands  against privileged actors,  made  by the poor or those speaking on their 
behalf,  for using national  and international  resources  and rules  to protect  the crucial human 
interests of the globally or locally disadvantaged. Note that this account takes sides on some of 
the semantic controversies surrounding human rights: it does not distinguish between so-called 
―positive‖  (economic,  social,  and  cultural)  rights  and  ―negative‖  (civil  and  political)  rights, 
merely noting that both may involve crucial interests; nor does it restrict the targets of human 
rights claims to states or governments, leaving open the idea that individuals, firms, and other 
private actors may be duty-bearers.  
The definition is also narrower than most accounts of rights claims. More particularly, 
this  definition  of  HRBAs  (i)  does  not  include  the  rights  of  the  relatively  well-off,  focusing 
instead  on  poverty;  and  (ii)  emphasizes  resources  and  regulation  rather  than  the  more 
interactional duties that arise from the natural law and natural rights traditions. (It is for this 
reason that we refer, in this paper, to ―human rights based approaches,‖ rather than the more 
widely  used  phrase  ―rights  based  approaches‖  to  development.)  HRBAs,  moreover,  do  not 
subsume  the  various  other  social  practices  and  rules  that  underpin  political  morality,  social 
stability, and modern economic growth. HRBAs may include principles by which these other 
institutions  and  rules  systems  might  be  evaluated;  but  HRBAs  cannot  construct  all  social 
principles from the ground up, as they leave out many obvious and important elements of social 
organization. For these reasons, and probably others as well, it would be a mistake to equate 
HRBAs with more encompassing accounts of social justice or social change. In particular, we 
understand HRBAs to be targeted interventions on the part of governments and donors; and we 4 
 
distinguish them from broader transformations in state-society relations, such as democratization 
or  the  creation  of  ―open  access  orders‖(North,  Wallis,  and  Weingast  2009),  that  have  large 
economic repercussions.  
So  far,  we  have  said  little  about  what  kinds  of  institutions  HRBA  principles  speak 
through.  We have left the definition deliberately open because HRBAs entail various kinds of 
―mechanisms.‖ For instance, HRBAs sometimes entail persuading states to ratify and then live 
up  to  international  and  regional  human  rights  treaty  commitments,  enhancing  a  variety  of 
accountability oriented institutions in governments and donors (e.g., human rights commissions, 
ombudsmen, agencies of administrative redress), persuading citizens to think of themselves as 
rights-holders through civil society-based rhetoric, and employing legal mobilization in national 
courts.
2 In a given country, HRBAs might employ any combination of these ―mechanisms,‖ and 
the quality of the institutions sustaining these sub-approaches varies significantly, even within a 
given country. As a result, it is difficult to demarcate the boundaries of an HRBA in a given 
context, and to identify its contribution to development in isolation from the institutions it relies 
on.  The  approach  we  take  here,  therefore,  is  analytic  rather  than  strictly  empirical.  We 
differentiate HRBAs on the basis of four analytic components: HRBAs rooted in international 
and regional treaties, policies and principles of donors and executive agencies, normative beliefs, 
and constitutional rights. We try to assess the prospects for each on the basis of extant research 
on the channels through which they are likely to operate. (But although we isolate them for 
analytic purposes, these components rely on and activate each other.) In the remainder of this 
                                                 
2 For descriptions of HRBAs or RBAs, see Banik, Dan 2010. Poverty and elusive development: 
Universitetsforlaget., Uvin, P. 2004. Human rights and development: Kumarian Pr., OHCHR, Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights. 2006. Frequently asked questions on a human rights-based approach to 
development cooperation: United Nations Pubns., Jonsson, Urban. 2005. "A human rights-based approach to 
programming." Reinventing Development:47-62., Darrow, Mac and Amparo Tomas. 2005. "Power, capture, and 
conflict: a call for human rights accountability in development cooperation." Human Rights Quarterly 27:471-538.. 5 
 
paper,  we  briefly  review  the  first  three  kinds  of  HRBAs  before  characterizing  the 
judicial/constitutional mode in greater detail.  
 
Global Compliance  
The  UN  Office  of  the  High  Commissioner  for  Human  Rights  names  nine  core 
international human rights treaties: the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Racial Discrimination, 1965; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1965; 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966; the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 1979; the Convention against 
Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 1984; the convention 
on the Rights of the Child, 1989; the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of 
All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, 1990; the International Convention for the 
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, 2006; and the Convention on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities, 2006.
3 There are also several Optional Protocols attached to these 
treaties, and the several regional treaties with human rights components (along with their 
amendments), such as the European Social Charter, 1961; the American Convention on Human 
Rights, 1978; and the African Charter on Human and Peoples‘ Rights, 1981. It is often said that 
these various instruments are grounded, for purposes of interpretation and inspiration, in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948.  
One  analytic  component  of  HRBAs  pressures  states  to  ratify  these  regional  and 
international  instruments,  and  uses  the  fact  of  ratification  to  hold  states  to  account  for  the 
delivery of increased and higher quality development assistance. This holding to account can 
                                                 
3 See http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/. 6 
 
take both legal and political forms, and can operate both on rich country governments and on 
developing country governments. When first conceived in the mid to late 1940s, the international 
human rights regime was intended to operate juridically (Beitz 2009; Glendon 2002). Treaty 
bodies would hear complaints against UN member states in a court-like setting, and they would 
issue  opinions  that  would  be  binding,  from  the  point  of  view  of  international  law.  The 
effectiveness of human rights courts at the international level is somewhat mixed (Helfer and 
Slaughter 1997b; Voeten 2008).  
The juridical model has had very limited impact in motivating rich country governments 
to increase the quantity or quality of development assistance. As a textual matter, none of the 
core international human rights treaties establishes obligations of development assistance on the 
part of rich country governments, and a draft of an international instrument related to the Right 
to Development has languished without much prospect of achieving approval by the General 
Assembly.
4 Quasi-juridical modes of development review, such as the World Bank‘s Inspection 
Panel, have reoriented or blocked development projects in new cases; but neither the World 
Bank nor the IMF is bound by international human rights treaties, and complaints that have been 
lodged have almost entirely focused on acts of commission rather than omission.
5  
As  contributors  to  political  mobilization,  however,  human  rights  treaties  may  be 
beginning to play a role in pressuring rich country governments to in crease the quantity and 
quality of development assistance. Pogge (2002) and others have argued human rights demand a 
                                                 
4 The Declaration on the Right to Development was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1986; and while 
proponents have attempted to put together a binding international instrument, that effort has not succeeded. For the 
text see http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/rtd.htm. For a history and analysis see Sengupta, Arjun. 2002. "On the 
Theory and Practice of the Right to Development." Human Rights Quarterly 24:837-889.. 
5 An exception is the recent World Bank Inspection Panel case on the Land Management and Administration Project 
in Cambodia, Request RQ 09/08. Documentation is available here: 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTINSPECTIONPANEL/0,,contentMDK:22326773~menuPK:6
4129250~pagePK:64129751~piPK:64128378~theSitePK:380794~isCURL:Y,00.html  7 
 
reform of the international aid architecture, as well as of international trade, carbon emissions, 
tax policies, and intellectual property regimes.   While it is possible to ground such rules in 
Article 28 of the UDHR, which states that ―Everyone is entitled to a social and international 
order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized,‖ that 
provision, to date, typically plays a stronger role in motivating activism than structuring state-
party negotiations regarding international regime design.  
At the regional level, quasi-juridical human rights treaty bodies have made significant 
rulings in a number of cases (Langford 2008a; Langford 2008b). The numbers of rulings related 
to development are relatively small (the Inter-American Court of Human Rights had issued some 
92 opinions in 2009), and partial or non-compliance are more common than full compliance 
(Hawkins  and  Jacoby  2008).  The  basic  problem  remains  that  of  the  absence  of  a  political 
authority above states, or international anarchy, which neo-realists emphasize (Krasner 1993).  
The strongest effects of international human rights treaties are expected to be visible at 
the national, rather than the international or regional, levels. The literature has developed an 
approach to human rights treaty compliance that Simmons (2009:125) calls a ―domestic politics 
theory of treaty compliance.‖ In that approach, compliance requires domestic pressure on the 
government. The pressure might take the form of NGO- and civil society-initiated mobilization 
on  behalf  of  treaty  goals,  the  judicial  application  of  treaties  and  the  human  rights  norms 
embedded in them to domestic settings, or the empowerment of elements of the executive whose 
goals are consistent with treaty objectives.  
The empirical record of the effects of treaty ratification on human rights outcomes at the 
national  level  remains  mixed.  Hafner-Burton  (2008)  finds  that  the  presence  of  NGOs  is 
associated with (incomplete and transient) compliance with treaties in the area of political rights. 8 
 
Neumayer (2005) finds that civil society strength increases the likelihood of compliance with 
human rights treaties.  Helfer and Slaughter (1997a) argue that supranational adjudication of 
human  rights  treaties  in  Europe  empowered  domestic  courts  and  individuals  in  particular 
countries. Powell and Staton (2009) argue that the effectiveness of the domestic legal regime 
constrains  states‘  choices  to  violate  human  rights.  Moravcsik  argues  that  treaty  effects  are 
conditional on the relative strength of domestic political actors (political parties, NGOs, and 
others), who in liberal democratic regimes support the treaty goals (Moravcsik 1997). (Gauri 
2011)  contends  that  ratification  of  the  CRC  was  correlated  with  a  subsequent  increase  in 
immunization rates, but only in upper middle and high income countries. Helfer documents how 
the ―overlegalization‖ of the human rights regime led Caribbean governments to opt out of treaty 
agreements  and  resulted,  in  some  cases,  in  worse  human  rights  outcomes  (Helfer  2002). 
Hathaway finds that ―state expressions of commitment to human rights through treaty ratification 
may sometimes relieve pressure on states to pursue real changes in their policies and thereby 
undermine the instrumental aims of those very same treaties.‖ (Hathaway 2002) Simmons (2009) 
is  probably  the  most  optimistic,  finding  that  treaty  ratification  was  associated  with  better 
performance on child labor and gender equality. Overall, however, the empirical work on the 
contemporaneous effects of treaty ratification on development outcomes is relatively limited, and 
the findings mixed.    
Constructivists, however, argue that over longer time periods debates surrounding human 
rights can change identities, interests, and preferences in such a way that government leaders and 
citizens  begin  to  embrace  human  rights  norms.  The  processes  through  which  these  change 
include NGO pressure and transnational advocacy that eventually lead governments to move 
from repressing human rights movements to endorsing them, often by enhancing the stature of 9 
 
reformers  in  the  coalition  (Risse,  Ropp,  and  Sikkink  1999).  (This  suggests  that  some 
constructivist accounts are not inconsistent with domestic mobilization explanations.) On the 
other hand, the processes can be more sociological in nature, involving personal and institutional 
interactions that lead particular interpretations of human rights norms to be internalized (Koh 
1999),  or  peer  influences  to  affect  observable  behavior  through  processes  of  acculturation 
(Goodman and Jinks 2005). 
In  summary,  theory  suggests  that  treaty-based  HRBAs  are  more  likely  to  achieve 
―enforcement‖ or ―compliance‖  at  the national level  through domestic political  mechanisms, 
such  as  civil  society  organizations,  courts,  and  bureaucratic  entrepreneurs,  than  at  the 
international  or  regional  levels  through  quasi-juridical  enforcement.  The  evidence  to  date 
indicates that treaties can have some limited direct, contemporaneous impact on development 
outcomes. It is likely that treaties have more long-term effects on development policies through 
constructivist channels; but more empirical work along these lines remains to be done.  
 
Policies and Programming  
  A number of international and bilateral development agencies have endorsed a human 
rights orientation in the provision of health care and education in developing countries.
6 The 
notion of rights as high priority goals is implicit in some of the legal documents underlying the 
rights approach to development. The WHO Constitution, 1946, and the Declaration of Alma Ata, 
                                                 
6 See, for example, DFID, Department for Internatinal Development. 1997. "Realising human rights for poor 
people.", UNDP, United Nations Development Program. 2000. Human Development Report. New York: Oxford 
University Press, UNESCO, United Natinos Educaitonal, Scientific, and Cultural Organization. 2000. World 
Education Report 2000: The Right to Education: Towards Education for All Throughout Life. Paris: Unesco.. 
Summary reviews are Hamm, B.I. 2001. "A human rights approach to development." Human Rights Quarterly 
23:1005-1031, Piron, Laure-Helene. 2005. "Rights based Approaches and Bilateral Aid Agencies: More Than a 
Metaphor?" IDS Bulletin 36:19-30.. 
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1978, for instance, make reference to the ―highest attainable standard of health,‖ which implicitly 
acknowledges that many developing countries cannot provide comprehensive health care for all 
of their citizens. The WHO interprets the principle to mean that governments should put into 
place ―policies and action plans which will lead to available and accessible health care for all in 
the shortest possible time.‖ (WHO 2002) The UN also describes the right to education as a 
mandate that is being progressively realized (UNESCO 2000). A number of large international 
and domestic NGOs have also adopted human rights based approach to service provision.  
  It  is  difficult  to  characterize  the  policies  and  programming  approaches  because  they 
sometimes  include  neighboring  development  interventions,  and  sometimes  do  not.  These 
neighboring development interventions involve a variety of efforts to introduce accountability 
into development governance, and include urban service delivery scorecards, social audits, the 
establishment  of  redress  mechanisms  in  donor  projects  and  government  line  agencies, 
participatory  involvement  in  development  programming  such  as  ―community-driven 
development,‖ and national consultations such as poverty-reduction strategy processes (PRSPs). 
Policies and programing can also involve strengthening human rights commissions, information 
campaigns,  and  creating  or  strengthening  public  sector  ombudsmen  or  other  accountability 
offices (e.g., comptrollers, auditors, the ―Ministerios Publicos‖ in Latin America). Some forms of 
HRBAs emphasize participation in sectors, such as informed consent so that patients can make 
fully  informed  treatment  decisions  and  parental  participation  so  that local  understandings  of 
respect for elders and holidays are included in classroom practices. More encompassing accounts 
of HRBAs in donor policies include putting conditionality for development assistance on human 
rights performance, placing greater weight on distributional outcomes instead of average growth 
or  employment  rates,  working  with  excluded  populations,  policy  dialogue  on  human  rights 11 
 
conducted  by  development  agencies,  and  human  rights-related  projects  (e.g.,  security  forces 
training and prison conditions projects).  
  There is now some evidence on the effectiveness of HRBAs in these settings, but the 
overall  effects  seem  to  vary  with  the  local  context  and  institutional  details.  For  instance,  a 
newspaper campaign in Uganda aimed at reducing corruption by providing schools and parents 
with information to monitor the way that local officials handled educational transfers reduced the 
capture of public funds and increased student enrollment and learning (Reinikka and Svensson 
2005).  But  in  a  set  of  interventions  in  India,  however,  there  was  no  significant  effect  of 
information  campaigns  on  community  involvement,  teacher  effort,  or  learning  outcomes 
(Banerjee, Banerji, Duflo, Glennerster, and Khemani 2008).   
 
 
Rights Talk and Rights Consciousness 
Rights-based  approaches  to  development  do  not  always  take  the  form  of  formal 
institutions and mechanisms, such as international human rights treaties or human rights based 
approaches to programming, policy and legislation. They also, potentially, constitute ―politics 
from  below‖  or  processes  of  ―social  accountability‖  (Peruzzotti  and  Smulovitz  2006)  that 
activists, non-governmental organizations, and social movements engage in. Merry (2003) notes 
that ―rights talk remains a dominant framework for contemporary social justice movements‖; 
and, more generally, Dembour (1996) observes that it is hardly possible to open a newspaper 
without coming across a reference to human rights. 
 As noted above, we understand HRBAs to include rights talk where the poor or those 
speaking on their behalf address human rights based claims against privileged actors, in order to 
protect their crucial human interests.  We exclude, here, rights talk that defends the intellectual 12 
 
property of firms and other privileged actors, libertarian discourse that understands redistribution 
to be rights violation, and related arguments. This understanding highlights a conceptual and 
political  problem  for  this  HRBA  channel:  a  crucial  aspect  of  human  rights  is  their  role  in 
elevating the dignity, self-esteem, and capacity to mobilize of those whose rights are violated or 
unfulfilled, but the rights discourse they then use for political mobilization is also a bulwark to 
protect the interests of the privileged.   
The main ―mechanisms‖ of rights-talk are the formation of rights consciousness on the 
part of those whose rights are violated. Human rights norms have encouraged the formation and 
probably promoted the effectiveness of civil society organizations (CSOs), both in developing 
and rich countries; and the CSOs have in turn both pressured governments and provided direct 
services to poor people. HRBAs might also directly raise the expectations of citizens regarding 
what they are entitled to.
7 
How is rights consciousness formed? What explains that transition in outlook from, as 
Hannah Pitkin puts it, ―I want to‖ to ―I am entitled to‖? (Pitkin 1981: 347) Rights consciousness 
and its role in shaping agency and political action in social movements has been the focus of a 
rich tradition of socio-legal research, with scholars such as Sally Engle-Merry, Sally Falk More, 
Stuart Scheingold and Michel McCain making central contributions to our understanding of how 
this phenomenon plays out, its potential as well as its limitations (Englund and Nyamnjoh 2004; 
Moore 2005; Sarat and Scheingold 2006). It is clear that norms associated with human rights 
have  shaped  historical  developments.  Paradigmatic  examples  include  the  US  civil  rights 
                                                 
7 Although HRBAs typically focus on the rights-holders, they can also affect duty-bearers by activating their moral 
obligations. They might directly influence developing country officials and politicians when they formulate and 
implement government policies on topics such as school fees, child labor, taxation, and social assistance. They 
might also influence governments in rich countries to increase development assistance, or to change rules that 
govern the cross-national flows of goods, services, capital, and people. Human rights norms might also change the 
practices of multinational firms and donors, making them more responsive to the needs of poor people in developing 
countries. 13 
 
movement (Lieberman 2002; Smith 1997), the French Revolution (Sewell 1985), the emergence 
of international norms of multilateralism and human rights (Crawford 2002; Hunt 2007; Risse-
Kappen, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999), and the suppression of the slave trade and decolonization 
(Crawford 2002). One question that has increasingly concerned scholars interested in rights-talk 
and rights consciousness – in the light of the globalization of rights talk (Rodríguez Garavito and 
Santos 2005), which since the 1990s in particular has become a prominent feature of politics in 
all parts of the world – is how this phenomenon travels across countries and cultures. Attention is 
focused on understanding the conditions and limitations of ―legal transplants‖ and the processes 
of ―vernacularization‖ or ―interlegality‖ whereby global norms are appropriated and transformed 
by local actors in different social and political contexts (Rodríguez Garavito and Santos 2005). 
But HRBAs are not just the free flow of rights talk but the conscious attempt to generate 
rights talk in places where it is absent or weak. From the perspective of human rights talk as a 
human  rights  based  approach  to  (or  a  strategy  for)  development,  the  role  of  transnational 
activism, and the link between global and local activists, have become particularly interesting. A 
growing volume of scholarly literature is beginning to uncover and clarify the ways in which 
transnational activists engage in ―rights talk‖ with local actors around the globe, exchanging 
ideas,  rhetorical  ‗tools‘  and  advocacy  strategies,  joining  forces  in  campaigns  and  around 
litigation efforts (Goodale and Merry 2007; Risse-Kappen, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999; Sikkink 
2011; Tarrow 2012).  
A significant challenge in this form of HRBA is the misfit between human rights norms 
and socially rooted practices in many developing countries. When human rights are discussed in 
HRBAs, they are typically conceived in one of two ways: as fundamental moral rights, drawing 
on the natural rights tradition; or as universal legal immunities and entitlements, drawing on the 14 
 
model of subjective rights established in positive law. Both of these standard accounts struggle 
with the fact of normative divergence on the ground; in other words, there are questions about 
whether  these  accounts  of  human  rights,  while  generating  enormous  passion  and  rhetorical 
power for many (particularly in urbanized and Westernized environments), are sufficiently and 
widely understood in the world so as to form the basis for ―an international bill of rights,‖ as 
many have hoped. Another way of putting this question is to ask whether human rights are 
intersubjectively rooted in shared social practices. This plays out on the ground when human 
rights advocates and donors using HRBAs struggle with whether to tolerate practices in, using 
Rawls‘  terms,  decent  but  hierarchical  societies.  Many  of  these  practices,  particularly  those 
involving  non-democratic  forms  of  political  legitimacy  and  traditional  personal  law,  seem 
legitimate in the eyes of many of their own citizens, and even more so when ―foreigners‖ and 
national elites are seen to be imposing controlling forms of law. Describing the challenges of the 
HRBA in Malawi, Banik (2010: 142, and quoting (Ribohn 2002): 176) notes that ―it is common 
to hear villagers – and even highly educated Malawians – argue that maintaining traditional 
culture if of paramount consideration, even if this means overriding universalistic human rights 
considerations . . . ‗the emphasis on traditional culture and its consequences may be seen as a 
reaction against the transnational policies embraced by the government.‘‖  
Overall, rights talk and rights consciousness is a long-term driver of societal change. But 
further work is needed on the circumstances under which consciously designed rights talk in 
HRBAs directly contributes to this change, and the circumstances under which it is ineffectual 




Constitutionally Based Legal Mobilization  
Constitutionally based legal mobilization for social and economic rights takes different 
forms, but the most typical, which will be the focus here, is litigation before domestic courts.
8 
Court cases on social and economic rights have increased in frequency and scope in many parts 
of the world over the last two decades, including in developing countries  (Langford 2008a). It 
has become the focus of considerable attention – both from activists and scholars – as an avenue 
for bringing social and economic rights to bear in national politics.  In a situation where many 
countries have adopted rights-rich constitutions and strengthened their judiciaries – and where 
democratic institutions are often weak or unresponsive to the needs of the poor – social rights 
litigation  represents  an  alternative  ―decentralized‖  means  for  holding  decisions-makers  at 
different levels to account for their constitutional rights obligations as they set priorities and 
distribute resources in legislation, policies and administrative decisions.  
When considering the pros and cons of litigation on social and economic rights, it is 
important to bear in mind that this is a diverse phenomenon, both in substance and form. Some 
countries and courts designate a broader range of social and economic rights as justiciable. The 
agents and form of litigation also varies. Individuals and group engage in litigation to improve 
their  own  individual  situation  and  address  specific  needs  –  but  social  and  economic  rights 
litigation is also a strategy pursued by actors and organizations on behalf of others, usually 
disadvantaged groups in society, as a means to achieve structural change.
9 Social rights claims 
may be (and are) made by all social classes; but, again, we focus here on litigation in the form of 
                                                 
8 Mobilization based on social and economic rights enshrined in national constitutions may also be focused on quasi-
legal bodies such as ombudsmen, human rights commissions, or administrative bodies. But it can also target and be 
used by political and electoral institutions, such as political parties. It should also be noted that constitutional 
litigation for social and economic rights may also be based on obligations to international legal norms.  
9 Social transformation understood as significant social change altering structured inequalities and power-relations in 
societies in ways that reduce the weight of morally irrelevant circumstances such as socio-economic status 16 
 
claims against privileged actors, made by the poor or those speaking on their behalf to protect 
their crucial human interests.  
The level, scope and form of HRBA litigation depends on four factors: a) organized and 
individual legal assistance, and the accessibility of courts; b) the receptiveness of courts, which 
in  turn  depends  on  patterns  of  judicial  recruitment  and  retention,  legal  traditions,  judicial 
strategies; c) the anticipated responses of the targets of litigation to court rulings; and d) the 
capacity for litigant follow up. There is substantial variation across these dimensions in different 
countries. Some, such as Colombia and Costa Rica, have very low thresholds for individuals to 
present social right claims. Others, such as India and South Africa, have higher thresholds for 
individual claims, but have broad standing provisions that make it relatively easy to bring public 
interest  litigation  claims.  Some  countries  have  organized  civil  society  groups  that  can  bring 
HRBA  legal  claims  (e.g.,  the  United  States,  India),  others  have  publicly  supported  legal 
institutions that can perform this task (e.g., Brazil), and others have neither.  
From the perspective of democracy, social rights litigation is promising, but also presents 
challenges conceptually as well as in practice. Litigation is inclusive and (at its best) enables a 
broad set of actors to participate in public deliberation on social policies. It encourages relevant 
information to be presented in a structured manner. By providing an alternative arena for social 
contestation,  litigation  may  enable  or  magnify  voices  that  are  marginalized  in  the  political 
process (or conversely, it may provide an extra arena for the dominant voice). Inclusiveness and 
increased  opportunities  for  participation,  transparency  and  accountability  are  all  ‗democratic 
goods‘ (Fredman 2008). On the other hand, social rights litigation also brings to a head the 
democratic dilemma of justifying the authority of non-elected judges in overruling democratic 
priority setting and preference aggregation.  17 
 
We will not go into the counter-majoritarian dilemma in any depth here. Suffice it to say 
that the process of judging social and economic rights have lead judges in different countries to 
develop new and creative forms of jurisprudence that seek to overcome this problem. Typically, 
this involves more dialogical forms of judgments, where the courts, rather than determining the 
material outcome of the case in detail, engage in a dialogue with political authorities.  
To give some examples:  The South  African Constitutional Court, in  the well known 
Grootboom case, ordered the government to develop a housing policy that also provided for 
people in desperate need, but left to the government authorities themselves to decide how this 
could  best  be  done.  The  Constitutional  Court  of  Colombia,  in  a  2004  judgment  regarding 
displaced  people  (T-025),  declared  an  ―unconstitutional  state  of  affairs‖  and  ordered  the 
government to engage in a deliberative process with stakeholders and come back with policies 
and plans attending to various rights of this vulnerable groups (Rodríguez Garavito 2010). In a 
similar (but much more politicized) 2008 judgment (T-760) the Constitutional Court ordered a 
participatory process for health system reform. The Supreme Court of Argentina in 2008 ordered 
a  number  of  municipalities  to  join  forces,  engage  in  a  dialogue  with  affected  groups,  and 
establish a structure to clean up the polluted Matanza-Riachuelo river basin, and report back on 
progress  within  regular  intervals.  These  examples  show  how  courts  –  particularly  in  cases 
concerning significant structural change – have sought to bring rights to bear on politics in ways 
that set general (but binding) parameters for politics, rather than ordering a specific policy.  
While  these  judgments  have  excited  legal  and  political  theorists,  and  drawn  much 
acclaim, critics have argued that litigants get little back for their efforts other than a seat at the 
table in a (sometimes fruitless or protracted) dialogue. Others respond that providing a seat at the 
table or privileged access to decision-makers is the most valuable aspect of litigation strategies. 18 
 
Particularly when litigation is part of a broader social mobilization process, social movements or 
NGOs may use the process itself (―the shadow of litigation‖) as leverage in a bargaining process 
with political authorities or commercial companies – sometimes settling cases out of court, and 
sometimes ―winning even when losing‖ (McCann 2006). More generally, any consideration of 
the potential of social and economic rights litigation to bring about social change should see 
litigation  as  part  of  a  broader  mobilization  process.  Not  only  may  the  litigation  process 
strengthen social mobilization in different ways – by providing visibility, structure and a focal 
point for mobilization efforts – out of court mobilization also increases possibilities for winning 
in court and, even more important, the chances of getting a favorable judgment implemented.  
Implementation, though, is often the Achilles heel of legally based strategies (Shankar 
and Mehta 2008). Critics have expressed doubts regarding the potential of litigation to bring 
about significant social change (Baxi 1988; Hirschl 2004; Rosenberg 1991). It is argued that the 
‗haves‘ are most likely to come out ahead in court, and that, even cases that do succeed in court 
are unlikely to lead to significant change unless they are supported by strong social actors, who 
are able to follow up on implementation and make the judgment bear on policy. It is also argued 
that  human  rights  based  mobilization  is  constraining  political  contestation  within  a  liberal 
framework, and diverting the attention and resources of social movements away from other, 
potentially more productive strategies. This should be taken seriously. On the other hand, it is 
important to consider what the alternatives to legal mobilization are in different societies. Much 
of the criticism of (and support for) litigation as a transformative strategy is also primarily based 
on normative arguments, and rest on relatively weak empirical grounds, typically from the US 
(McCann 2006). Studies of social rights litigation in developing countries include (Abramovich 19 
 
and Courtis 2002; Gargarella, Domingo, and Roux 2006; Langford 2008a). This literature does, 
however to a limited extent investigate the impact of the litigation.  
An ambitious attempt to analyze the impact of social rights litigation is Courting Social 
Justice: Judicial Enforcement of Social and Economic Rights in the Developing World (Gauri 
and Brinks 2008), a comparative study of litigation on health and education in Brazil, India, 
Indonesia, Nigeria, and South Africa. This study seeks to estimate the number of persons who 
directly  and  indirectly  benefit  from  judicial  decisions,  both  within  each  country  and 
comparatively and draws attention to the importance of systemic enforcement of social rights, 
arguing that enforcement resulting in policy change—if implemented—can easily outweigh the 
impact  of  thousands  of  individual  cases  where  courts  enforce  individual  rights  but  without 
generalizing the remedy.
10 It concludes that, on balance, the direct and indirect effects of social 
rights litigation are modest, but positive. Social goods are redistributed to people who need them, 
and the poor are at least as likely to benefit as the better -off. The privileged  are not seen  to 
monopolize the issues or capture state revenues through litigation. But while those who  use the 
courts and benefit from their judgments are, in general, not the elites (who need not rely on 
public services), they are also not the most vulnerable and excluded. While  Gauri and Brinks do 
not find that court decisions (so far) have had demonstrable macroeconomic consequences, they 
raise concerns that there might be a political backlash against judicialization of politics, if costs 
mount.  
Another set of studies appear in a volume that focuses more narrowly on health litigation 
in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, India and South Africa (Yamin and Gloppen 2011). 
                                                 
10 One example is the famous judgment on vehicle pollution in Delhi, where Indian Supreme Court demanded a shift 
toward cleaner fuel in the public transport system, significantly affecting hundreds of thousands of people, and 
advancing their right to live in a healthy environment. 20 
 
Litigation on health rights (and related rights to water, food, a healthy environment) constitutes a 
large and rapidly rising share of social rights litigation, particularly in Latin America. Litigating 
Health Rights examines how litigation takes different forms depending on the legal and socio-
political context, and how it plays out and influences health policies differently depending of the 
nature  of  the  health  system.  In  some  cases  litigation  seems  to  contribute  towards  better 
functioning  heath  systems  and  more  equality  between  patients;  in  other  contexts  the  effect 
appears to be the opposite. Litigation influences health policy in ways that not only affect the 
distribution  of  resources  among  individual  patients  and  social  groups,  but  also  the  relative 
emphasis placed on different forms of services. For example, litigation in some contexts seems to 
increase  spending  on  expensive  drugs  vis-à-vis  for  example  preventive  care.  It  may  thus  – 
depending on the baseline of services in society and what is litigated for – result in less (or more) 
efficient and fair use of health care resources. 
Summarizing,  constitutional  litigation  on  social  and  economic  rights  can  play  an 
important progressive role and advance the situation for marginalized and stigmatized groups 
(such as people living with HIV-AIDS, prisoners, indigenous and displaced people). Strategic 
litigation can also force governments to prioritize basic services of crucial importance to poor 
people  (food,  water,  sanitation,  health  services,  education)  –  not  least  in  countries  with 
significant state capacity, but that are marked by wide inequalities and where the poor often have 
a  weak  voice  vis-à-vis  political  decision-makers.
11  Litigation can also contribute towards 
solving complex collective action problems that political bodies cannot (or at least do not) handle 
                                                 
11 The larger picture shows that many of the countries that have been at the forefront with regard to social rights 
litigation are middle-income countries marked by huge inequalities (such as Colombia, Brazil and South Africa, 
which are among the most unequal countries in the world). More generally, countries with significant state capacity- 
including a reasonably well-functioning judiciary - but where large sections of the population are socially 
marginalised and the ruling elite is perceived as unresponsive - seem to provide particularly fertile grounds for social 
rights litigation. 21 
 
adequately,  such  as  pollution  problems  transcending  jurisdictional  boundaries  or  involving 
multiple  public  and  private  actors.  It  thus  merits  closer  examination  as  a  potential  (partial) 
solution to fundamental democratic challenges.  
We do, however, also know that litigation does not always provide an institutionalized 
voice for the poor. Under some conditions it is prone to elite (or at least middle-class) capture – 
particularly where litigation is a strategy pursued by individuals or groups for individual gain, 
and  relying  on  their  own  resources.    Further  work  is  needed  on  what  enables  a  pro-
poor/developmental outcome at the different stages of the litigation process. With regard to the 
mobilization phase (articulation of legal claims) we need better to understand:  
  how  litigation  interacts  with  other  mobilization  strategies  –  when  it  demobilizes  and 
depoliticizes – and when it does the opposite; and 
  why we see mobilization on certain issues and in certain contexts and not in others, and what 
role professional legal support organizations and activists play in (different types of) rights 
mobilization processes.  
With regard to the courts‘ handling of social rights claims we need better to understand:  
  what makes certain courts more prone to take up these types of cases and to deal with them in 
a way that is conducive to social transformation; and 
  the contexts under which social rights jurisprudence generates political backlash. 
With regard to the implementation phase we need: 
  better methodologies – and more systematic empirical data – for evaluating the impact of 
social rights litigation. 22 
 
Conclusion 
  Rights-based approaches to development have increased in popularity in recent years. 
While they vary widely, their potential, as well as the modes of political change they have a 
chance of engendering, can be analyzed on the basis of the institutional mechanisms they speak 
through. We find four such mechanisms: global compliance, policies and programming, rights 
talk, and legal mobilization. The most convincing accounts available to date involve the theory 
and  evidence  of  treaties  and  legal  strategies.  These  accounts  suggest  that,  under  certain 
circumstances, human rights based strategies can make a difference. Rights talk is consequential 
in the long term, but little evidence is available on the short-term consequences of consciously 
designed rights talk strategies. Policies and programming regarding HRBAs typically encompass 
a  broad  array  of  neighboring  development  strategies,  so  much  so  that  it  can  be  said  to  be 
mainstream  practice  in  development  organizations.  But  further  work  needs  to  be  done  to 
disaggregate the impact of these various approaches to HRBA policies and programming.  
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